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When Rational Basis Review is Irrational: An Argument for Applying
Heightened Scrutiny to Statutes Criminalizing Homelessness
Talia Lewis
Rational basis review under Constitutional equal protection jurisprudence
affords the classes it protects the lowest standard of review—one that is very
deferential to the dictates of the legislature. The Supreme Court has determined that
individuals facing statutory discrimination solely due to economic status or wealth
are accorded this “rational basis” standard of review. Homeless people in the United
States have historically faced regulations and statutes that effectively criminalize
them. Although these statutes necessarily target the homeless due to economic status,
no court has yet determined if the homeless face statutory discrimination solely
based on their economic status. If the homeless face statutory discrimination for any
reasons in addition to economic status, these criminalizing statutes should be
reviewed under a higher standard. There are three levels of heightened scrutiny:
strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis “with a bite.” This Article
argues that the homeless—individuals, or as a class—should be accorded a
heightened standard of review by courts reviewing the statutes that target them. It
begins with a review of equal protection and due process precedents and a discussion
about the homeless population in America. It continues by analyzing how a lawyer
could best argue for applying each level of heightened scrutiny to statutes targeting
the homeless. Unquestionably, the homeless are set further back when governing
bodies legislate to criminalize their involuntary conduct. The judiciary should extend
protections to this vulnerable group by reviewing the statutes criminalizing
homelessness with a higher level of scrutiny.
INTRODUCTION
The mythic homeless person—the man living alone, dirty, underneath a
bridge, suffering with drug addiction and mental infirmity—has done a severe
disservice to the public’s perception of the homeless population. A large portion of
the American populace believe that homelessness is a direct result of the sufferer’s
poor choices. 1 Thus, the homeless are seen as an unsympathetic group. This myth is
just that: an untruth. In fact, homeless people come in all shapes and sizes. Many
families, for example, suffer from homelessness as a result of eviction and lack of

1

See Kyra Gurney, Miami Beach Law Limits Panhandling. Civil Rights Groups Say that Violates Free
Speech., MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 5, 2018, 3:18 PM),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/miami-beach/article217672810.html
(quoting local mayor saying the “homeless include people who are mentally ill and who are dangerous to
both residents and visitors and that can’t be ignored.”).
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affordable housing. 2 Although many of the homeless population do suffer with
mental illness and substance abuse, “many more homeless [people] do not.” 3
The poor public perception of the homeless population has resulted, at least
tangentially, in statutes that target this group for engaging in life-sustaining
activities. 4 Even when not explicitly targeted toward the population, homeless
people are the de facto victims of this type of legislation. 5 Anti-camping statutes, for
example, may seem like a good enforcement tool to regulate use of public parks. 6 In
practice, however, these ordinances permit police departments to evict and arrest
homeless people after they’ve set up “camp.” 7 These statutes are termed
“criminalization” statutes because they effectively criminalize acts that otherwise
are considered innocent.
Lawsuits have been filed and litigated that challenge the constitutionality of
these criminalization statutes. 8 Some of the more successful lawsuits have
challenged statutes based on the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment. 9 This Amendment prohibits punishing someone for any
involuntary status because it is cruel and unusual to do so. 10 The homeless
plaintiffs in Pottinger argued that they were being unconstitutionally targeted by
the City of Miami for their homeless status in contravention with the Eighth
Amendment. 11 The court agreed and held that the City’s enforcement tactics
against the homeless, which criminalized innocent conduct like sleeping, eating,
sitting, and more, “effectively punish[ed] them for something for which they may
not be convicted”: acts inherent in their homeless status. 12 Some would argue that
there are already sufficient routes for lawyers to challenge statutes for their
2

3
4

5

6

7
8

9
10
11
12

See generally Cynthia Griffith, Lack of Affordable Housing Remains the Leading Cause of Homelessness,
INVISIBLE PEOPLE (Mar. 22, 2019), https://invisiblepeople.tv/lack-of-affordable-housing-remains-the-leadingcause-of-homelessness/ (explaining how people in America cannot afford to pay rent and often become
homeless as a consequence).
ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 50 (3d ed. 2014).
U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, SEARCHING OUT SOLUTIONS: CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVES TO
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS 7 (2012).
See Justin Jouvenal, Homeless Say Booming Cities Have Outlawed Their Right to Sleep, Beg, and Even Sit,
WASH. POST (June 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/homeless-say-boomingcities-have-outlawed-their-right-to-sleep-beg-and-even-sit/2016/06/02/7dde62ea-21e3-11e6-aa8442391ba52c91_story.html.
Anti-camping statutes are understood to be laws that criminalize the act of sleeping or erecting tents on
specific property. See, e.g., Nicholas May, Fourth Amendment Challenges to “Camping Ordinances”: A Legal
Strategy to Force Legislative Solutions to Homelessness, 11 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 1, 1 (2008).
See, e.g., SACRAMENTO, CAL., CITY CODE § 12.52.030 (prohibiting camping or using “camp paraphernalia” on
any public or private property).
See, e.g., Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (granting relief to class of homeless
plaintiffs that prohibited officials from arresting homeless individuals for engaging in harmless, lifesustaining activity); Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1995) (finding ordinance challenged did
not unconstitutionally restrict homeless individual’s right to travel and did not violate the state or federal
constitutions by allowing punishment based on status).
See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1564–65.
See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1564–65.
Id.
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homeless clients, like those conferring Eighth Amendment protections. 13
Unfortunately, some of these protections have proven tenuous. 14
The judiciary should review statutes involving homeless people higher
scrutiny under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth and
Fifth Amendments to remedy the unhoused population’s heightened vulnerability.
The judiciary applies levels of scrutiny to statutes that affect certain classes of
people to ensure they pass constitutional muster. 15 These classes are groups that
require further protection from officials. 16 It has been decades since the first lawsuit
advocated for homeless rights in court by challenging discriminatory statutes and
enforcement methods. 17 Still, an inordinate number of statutes target and
criminalize the homeless. 18
For homeless individuals to be reestablished back into society, they need time
and space; they need society to recognize their humanity. 19 This requires harsher
oversight by the judiciary over the legislation that regulates their conduct. By
applying a higher level of scrutiny to the laws targeting the homeless population,
governments will have less leeway to pass these criminalizing statutes or
ordinances. Rather, the laws that are passed will be more purposeful and less
frivolous, allowing homeless individuals the ability to rebuild their lives without
constant fear of arrest for trespass or violation of any number of these ordinances.
This Article argues that courts should accord homeless people higher scrutiny
under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses to the federal Constitution.
Lawyers could persuade the courts to apply higher scrutiny to statutes
criminalizing the homeless in a number of ways. Section I.A of this paper will
discuss who the homeless population is. Section I.B will examine the constitutional
background to the arguments I make in Part II. Section I.C will review the types of
criminalization statutes on the books and why legislatures pass them. Part II will
13

14

15

16
17
18

19

For more information about Eighth Amendment Challenges and how they work in the context of
challenging statutes criminalizing homelessness, see Edward J. Walters, No Way Out: Eighth Amendment
Protection for Do-Or-Die Acts of the Homeless, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1619 (1995).
See Jerry Ianelli, Judge Invalidates Miami’s Landmark Homeless-Protection Order from 1998, MIAMI NEW
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019, 3:16 PM), https://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/miami-judge-throws-out-pottingerhomeless-protection-law-11087371 (discussing Miami federal judge’s decision to invalidate the Pottinger
agreement made pursuant to findings that the homeless in the city needed further protection from city
enforcement measures unconstitutionally criminalizing the homeless for innocent conduct).
See Susannah W. Pollvogt, Beyond Suspect Classifications, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 739, 742 (2014) (“The
Court has, in fact, devised mechanisms that are supposed to be particularly adept at rooting out unfair
prejudices: suspect classification analysis and the associated tiers-of-scrutiny framework.”).
Id.
See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1565.
See generally U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, supra note 4 (discussing how criminalizing
homelessness negatively impacts communities and individuals nationwide and how some communities have
contributed to or remedied the problem).
See generally Stephen J. Schnably, Rights of Access and the Right to Exclude: The Case of Homelessness, in
PROPERTY LAW ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY 553 (G.E. van Maanen & A.J. van der Walt eds.,
1996) (explaining that the more that homeless people resist being pathologized and the more their relatable
problems are recognized as such, the more potential there is to implement solutions to address
homelessness).
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review and discuss the better arguments for according the homeless heightened
scrutiny. Section II.A focuses on strict scrutiny, Section II.B focuses on intermediate
scrutiny, and Section II.C focuses on rational basis “with a bite” scrutiny.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Who are the Homeless?
The homeless population is innately hard to define. The McKinney-Vento Act
(originally the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act), signed into law by
President Clinton in 1987, was the first federal legislation to furnish a definition for
the group. 20 In short, the Act states a “homeless” person “lacks a fixed, regular, and
adequate nighttime residence,” has a primary residence “not designed for or
ordinarily used as a regular sleeping accommodation for human beings,” or “an
individual or family who will imminently lose their housing.” 21
This legislation provided a foundation for defining who is “homeless,” but it
falls short of including many others in its definition that might otherwise be
considered homeless. For example, the Act omits people who may be staying with
friends or family, employing short-term living arrangements like motels, and those
in prisons or other institutions. 22 The McKenny-Vento definition is still a point of
contention for legislators, service practitioners, and scholars today because
homeless individuals who fall outside its parameters are not eligible for support
from the federal government. 23 As a result, logging statistics about the homeless
population is challenging. Some research groups follow the definition from the
McKinney-Vento Act, and others make their definitions broader to include the
groups of homeless left outside the scope of the Act’s definition. 24
To answer the question asking who composes the homeless population, it is
important to discuss the problems with “counting” and gathering data on this
transient, and ever-changing group. There are a number of methods that have been
employed by the United States over time, but two methods are most commonly
used: (1) the “point in time count”; and (2) estimating the number of people who
have been homeless over a specific period of time. 25 Both methods are imperfect.
The “point-in-time count” is self-explanatory. Data is gathered about how
many people are homeless over a three-day period. 26 To gather this information,
volunteers may be assigned to search a span of blocks or parks. 27 These volunteers
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

27

Jennifer Lee-Anderson, Homelessness Count Methodologies Literature Review, HOMELESSNESS RES. &
ACTION COLLABORATIVE PUBLICATIONS & PRESENTATIONS 7 (2019).
42 U.S.C. § 11302 (2012).
Lee-Anderson, supra note 20.
See id.
See id.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 51.
How We Count People Experiencing Homelessness, U.S. CENSUS 2020, https://2020census.gov/en/what-is2020-census/focus/people-experiencing-homelessness.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
Id.; SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 51.
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then relay information on the people they encountered to localities or
organizations. 28 These agencies utilize that information, in conjunction with
information from city homeless shelters, to generate point-in-time estimates. 29
Unfortunately, this method has severe limitations. It "will indicate that the extent
of homelessness is much smaller than the size suggested by studies that look at the
number of people who have experienced homelessness within a specified period of
time." 30 Furthermore, the study will mischaracterize the population of individuals
who suffer homelessness because it’s more likely to cover individuals who are
chronically homeless, rather than temporarily homeless. 31 Therefore, the point-intime count is less accurate for gathering data on the whole homeless population and
more accurate for gathering data on the chronically homeless population.
On the other hand, estimating the number of people who have been homeless
over a period of time is more likely to produce information characterizing the entire
homeless population. These data are collected by employing numerous methods,
including surveys via telephone and in-person interviews. 32 However, this method
faces its own hurdles because these types of studies require the surveyors to furnish
definitions of “homeless people,” and create plans for how to reach this population—
which can be challenging, to say the least. 33 One salient example reveals how these
studies furnish more, sometimes stark, data about the homeless population. The
2012 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress shows that in 2011, “more
than twice as many people, 1.5 million, were in a homeless shelter or transitional
housing facility for one or more nights during the year than were homeless on a
single night in January.” 34 These “period of time” studies have provided some of the
best data about the homeless population in the United States.
Despite the flaws with data collection on the homeless population, there is a
good pool of information gathered over the last twenty years that can be used to
make conclusions about who composes the homeless population. One undisputed,
empirical conclusion is “that homelessness is associated with extreme poverty.” 35
Commencing in the Great Depression, and continuing through today, there has
been a growing chasm separating the rich from the poor in the United States. 36 This
income inequality has manifested in different proportions of America’s population
suffering worse life, health, and economic outcomes than others. These outcomes
are clearly represented in the composition of America’s homeless.

28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 51.
Id. at 50–51.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id. at 52; Lee-Anderson, supra note 20.
See Lee-Anderson, supra note 20.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 52.
Id. at 54.
DEBORAH K. PADGETT, BENJAMIN F. HENWOOD & SAM J. TSEMBERIS, HOUSING FIRST: ENDING HOMELESSNESS,
TRANSFORMING SYSTEMS, AND CHANGING LIVES 16 (2015).
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Social factors, combined with economic and historic events, collectively
created a huge disparity of African Americans, as compared to whites, in the
homeless population. Segregation, the high demand for single-family homes
following World War II, “white flight” to the suburbs, red-lining tactics, and
draconian drug policies all contributed to the multiplicity of hurdles faced by
African Americans to buy homes or enhance their economic statuses. 37 The result is
bleak:
Members of racial and ethnic minorities constitute about one third of
the U.S. population, one half of the poor, and almost two thirds of the
homeless. African Americans constitute 12% of the U.S. population,
about one half of the homeless, and up to 85% of the long-term or
chronically homeless (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 2010). 38
In short, the total United States population of specific minority groups, including
and especially African Americans, is dramatically overrepresented in the homeless.
Apart from racial disparities, there are other disparately represented groups
in the homeless population. This population, in general, is composed of far more
men than women: “[a]mongst individuals . . . 70 percent are men.” 39 Moreover,
many more individuals than families experience homelessness: seventy percent are
individuals, and thirty percent of the population are “people in families with
children.” 40 Another salient subpopulation is unaccompanied youth, which includes
those under the age of twenty-five. 41 These youth compose about six percent of the
total homeless population. 42 Veterans, too, compose seven percent of the total
homeless populace. 43
Beyond those who are already struggling with homelessness, there remain
households who face a constant risk of homelessness. This population includes
many who live paycheck to paycheck and who struggle to afford basic necessities. 44
These impoverished individuals and families turn to government assistance for help
fending off eviction and locating affordable housing—even temporarily. 45 In the
1960s, the U.S. government passed federal legislative intervention to aid lowincome people with housing expenses. 46 Subsequently, Nixon’s election and “the
37
38
39

40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
State of Homelessness: 2020 Edition, NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS,
https://endhomelessness.org/homelessness-in-america/homelessness-statistics/state-of-homelessness-report/
(last visited Jan. 19, 2021).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See generally Robert Haveman, Rebecca Blank, Robert Moffitt, Timothy Smeeding & Geoffrey Wallace, The
War on Poverty: Measurement, Trends, and Policy, 34 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 593 (2015).
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economic recession of the 1970s put an effective halt to new public housing
developments.” 47 Then, in the 1980s, the government contributed to the growing
problem by dramatically reducing federally subsidized housing. 48 Despite rising
housing costs, the federal budget for housing assistance dropped almost in half from
1976 to 2002. 49 Now, 1.2 million households are on the verge of homelessness,
relying on public housing despite the poor conditions, strict oversight, and long
waiting lists. 50 In total, 42.6 million Americans survive hand-to-mouth—13.4% of
the United States population. 51 Despite the enormous need, there remains a “7.2
million unit shortage of affordable rental units available to our nation’s lowest
income renters.” 52 This shortage means many of our nation’s poorest people will
struggle to find a place to live:
To put this into context, this means that for every 100 extremely poor
households in the country, only 31 will find affordable and available
rental units. Sixty-nine of the 100 will be forced to pay more than they
can afford, leaving them unstably housed and vulnerable to
homelessness. 53
It is no secret why seeking and advocating for solutions to the threat of
homelessness is an important policy pursuit. A substantial population of Americans
constantly teeter on the verge of homelessness, and vulnerable populations—
overrepresented in the total homeless population—are made more vulnerable by
their homeless status. 54 In fact, homeless individuals have a harder time finding
and keeping jobs, their children are deprived of the opportunity to continually
attend school, and they are at much higher risk to suffer from “illness, mental
health problems, substance abuse and crime.” 55 State and local governments have
employed a number of different programs to attempt to address the issue, but in
2017, America’s homeless population rose for the first time in years. 56 This rise
evidences the lack of progress made by many of these initiatives. Thus, lawyers
should propose a solution to address the homeless population: to impose a higher
47
48

49
50
51
52
53
54

55
56

PADGETT ET AL., supra note 36, at 19.
NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS: ENDING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 18 (2018), https://nlchp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Housing-NotHandcuffs.pdf.
PADGETT ET AL., supra note 36, at 19.
See id. at 19.
Emily Walkenhorst, Census Figures Show Drop in State Poverty, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Sept. 13, 2018)
https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2018/sep/13/census-figures-show-drop-state-poverty/.
NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, supra note 48, at 19.
Id.
Homelessness and Racial Disparities, NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS,
https://endhomelessness.org/homelessness-in-america/what-causes-homelessness/inequality/ (last updated
Oct. 2020).
SCHWARTZ, supra note 3.
Christopher Weber & Geoff Mulvihill, America’s Homeless Population Rises for the First Time in Years, AP
NEWS (Dec. 6, 2017), https://apnews.com/47662ad74baf4bb09f40619e4fd25a94/America%27s-homelesspopulation-rises-for-first-time-in-years.
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level of scrutiny on the statutes that directly affect and oppress this group. This
method would force state and local governments to employ alternatives aside from
criminalizing homelessness. Without so many hurdles in the way of rebuilding their
lives—like arrest for frivolous misdemeanors, and mounting court costs for
trespassing tickets—homeless individuals will be empowered to address their first
and most prominent problem: finding a home.
B. Constitutional Background
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, stated
generally, ensures the citizenship and equality of all persons. It declares that the
states may not deprive “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of the law” or deprive “any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” 57 The Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses are part of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, but they tend to operate separately
from each other.
The Equal Protection Clause applies to the state and federal government
with equal force. Although there is no equal protection clause in the Fifth
Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection clause has been
interpreted to apply to the Federal Government. 58 The Court has, over time, cast a
skeptical eye on statutes drawing classifications between groups of people. 59
Statutes drawing distinctions based on “suspect classifications” are subjected
to a higher level of judicial review. 60 The Supreme Court applies heightened
scrutiny to laws found to discriminate against classes of people based on race,
alienage, and national origin. 61 The Court also applies heightened scrutiny to laws
found to discriminate against people based on sex and illegitimacy. 62 These are
considered “quasi-suspect” classes. 63 Some state courts have found that classifying
people according to sexual orientation also demands heightened scrutiny. 64 To
57
58
59
60
61
62

63

64

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954).
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533–34 (1996); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982); United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304. U.S. 144, 153 (1938).
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion); Courtney A. Powers,
Finding LGBTs a Suspect Class: Assessing the Political Power of LGBTs as a Basis for the Court’s
Application of Heightened Scrutiny, 17 DUKE J. GENDER, L. & POL’Y 385, 387 (2010) (“[T]he U.S. Supreme
Court has applied heightened scrutiny to laws that discriminate based on several ‘suspect’ classifications:
race, alienage, and national origin. It has also applied such scrutiny to ‘quasi-suspect’ classes including sex
and illegitimacy.”).
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 426, 430 (Conn. 2008). See generally Rachel F. Moran,
Quasi-Suspect Classes and Proof of Discriminatory Intent: A New Model, 90 YALE L.J. 912 (1981) (reviewing
the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence and the development of suspect and quasi-suspect
classes).
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 481 (holding a statutory ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional on equal
protection grounds).
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argue statutes that draw distinctions based on suspect classes are constitutional,
the government must show that the statute is “precisely tailored” to serve a
compelling state interest. 65 To show that statutes drawing distinctions based on
quasi-suspect classes are constitutional, the government must show an “exceedingly
persuasive justification” substantially related to a state interest. 66 If the
government cannot meet its burden, the law is deemed unconstitutional.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mirrors the language
from the Fifth Amendment, effectively applying “due process” requirements to the
states. 67 Due process includes two elements: procedural and substantive due
process. 68 Underlying these elements are other subsets of rights considered
protected by due process. 69
Substantive due process requires that governmental actors do not deprive
individuals of life, liberty, or property “even if those individuals receive an
adjudication in which ‘even the fairest possible procedure[s]’ are observed.” 70
“General law” due process protections are encompassed in the substantive Due
Process Clause. 71 This “conception interpreted due process to require general and
impartial laws rather than ‘special’ or ‘class’ legislation that imposed particular
burdens upon, or accorded special benefits to, particular persons or particular
segments of society.” 72 The general law due process accords similar protections to
those conveyed through the Equal Protection Clause; however, the most commonly
referenced and recognized form of substantive due process is “fundamental rights”
due process. 73 Under this doctrine, the Court determined that certain rights are so
“fundamental” that if the legislature passes a law infringing on those rights, the law
will be reviewed under a heightened scrutiny. 74 If the Court finds that the
infringement on the fundamental right is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest[,]” then the law is constitutional. 75 If that showing is not made, then
the law is unconstitutional. 76
Procedural due process requires governmental actors and the judiciary to
abide by a certain form of conduct during trial and ensure rules of fairness are

65
66
67
68
69
70

71
72
73
74
75
76

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982).
See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532–34.
See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 408 (2010).
See id. at 419–20.
Id. at 419 & n.37 (alteration in original) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
Id. at 423–24.
Id. at 425.
See id. at 427.
Williams, supra note 68, at 427.
Id.
See id.
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observed during that process. 77 Two of the better recognized procedural trial
requirements are notice and the opportunity for a hearing. 78 The Supreme Court
also recognized that the law requires “actor, reus, judex, regular allegations,
opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some settled course of judicial
proceedings . . .” for there to be adequate procedure. 79 Accordingly, the most wellrecognized application of procedural due process principles is courts’ obligation to
ensure fair procedures, meaning “compliance with duly enacted law and the
formality of an adjudication[, in addition to requiring] . . . that the judicial
procedures applied in connection with such an adjudication satisfy some normative
conception of farness . . . .” 80 To determine if compliance with these fundamental
procedural and fairness principles has been met, the Court applies the three-factor
balancing test promulgated in Mathews v. Eldridge. 81
C. The Criminalization of Homelessness: Statutory Challenges to be Made on
Equal Protection and Due Process Grounds
When lawyers file lawsuits against governing bodies—local, state, and
federal—they base constitutional challenges brought under these clauses on
statutes promulgated by the governing body in question. These statutes tend to be a
response to community residents who feel that homeless people are unsightly or
dangerous. 82 By utilizing criminal justice measures, the legislature can effectively
curtail the visibility of people experiencing homelessness. 83
There are numerous types of statutes aimed at remedying the unsightly
presence of homeless people in neighborhoods. These include: “mak[ing] it illegal to
sleep, sit, or store personal belongings in public spaces”; 84 making it illegal to camp
or use some type of shelter, makeshift or otherwise, on public or private property; 85
banning sleeping in cars; 86 punishing people for begging or panhandling; 87
77

78
79

80
81

82
83
84
85
86
87

See id. at 418 (“According to Justice Roberts, ‘[p]rocedural due process has to do with the manner of trial
[and] dictates that in conduct of judicial inquiry certain fundamental rules of fairness be observed.’”
(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 137 (Roberts, J., dissenting))).
See Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 2 (2006).
Williams, supra note 68, at 466 (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272, 280 (1855)).
Id. at 421–22.
424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976); Williams, supra note 68, at 422 & n.45 (“[C]ourts balance: (1) ‘the private
interest that will be affected by the official action’; (2) ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards’; and (3) ‘the Government’s interest, including function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substituted procedural requirement would entail.’” (quoting
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335)).
U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, supra note 4, at 5–6.
Id.
Id. at 6.
NAT’L L. CTR ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, supra note 48, at 23.
Id. at 25; U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, supra note 4, at 6.
NAT’L L. CTR ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, supra note 48, at 25.
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“ban[ning] or limit[ing] food distribution in public places . . . .”; 88 making it illegal to
use the bathroom or wash oneself outside (regardless of bathroom availability in the
area); 89 and “selective[ly] enforcing neutral laws such as jaywalking, loitering,
trespassing, and open container laws against people who are homeless.” 90 These are
the statutes that should be challenged under the Fourteenth and Fifth
Amendments’ Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
To make the challenges, a lawyer may argue on his client’s behalf that the
legislation is unconstitutional “on its face” or “as applied” to the client. 91 This
challenge makes it possible for the judiciary to invalidate the legislation. 92 If a court
determines that a statute is unconstitutional on its face, then “it must be
invalidated as to all possible applications and is thus rendered null and void.” 93 If a
court instead invalidates the statute as applied to the plaintiff(s) bringing suit, the
statute is invalid “only as applied to the plaintiff’s particular circumstances, in
which case the statute remains valid for other applications that do not raise similar
constitutional concerns.” 94 While invalidating a statute on its face may be a more
expansive remedy, a lawyer’s argument that a statute is unconstitutional as applied
can also invalidate statutes enforced against the homeless. If a statute is struck for
being unconstitutionally enforced against the homeless population, then it cannot
be utilized as an enforcement tactic against that same population in the same way
moving forward. 95
II. ANALYSIS
There are a number of different methods to obtain a higher level of scrutiny
than rational basis review. The three higher degrees of scrutiny are (in order from
highest to lowest): (1) strict scrutiny; (2) intermediate scrutiny; and (3) rational
basis with a bite scrutiny. 96 Each level of scrutiny can be argued for in different
ways.
88
89
90
91

92
93
94
95
96

Id.
U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, supra note 4, at 6.
Id. See generally NAT’L L. CTR ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, supra note 48, at 22–26.
See, e.g., Allen v. City of Sacramento, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 654, 659–60 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (challenging an
anti-camping ordinance on the basis that it is unconstitutional as written and because the city enforces the
ordinance in a discriminatory way). See generally Stefanie A. Lindquist & Pamela C. Corley, The MultipleStage Process of Judicial Review: Facial and As-Applied Constitutional Challenges to Legislation Before the
U.S. Supreme Court, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 467 (2011).
Lindquist & Corley, supra note 91, at 469.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Traditionally, “rational basis with a bite” scrutiny has not been formally recognized by the court. However,
scholars and practitioners in the legal profession generally accept it as a higher form of scrutiny. For a brief
overview of rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny standards, see R. Randall Kelso,
Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting
Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225
(2002). For a brief overview of rational basis with a bite review, see Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel, Note,
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A. Strict Scrutiny
The best way to argue for strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment is
by asserting that the statutes at issue infringe on the homeless plaintiff’s equal
protection and due process rights. The Court’s evolving doctrine reveals that the
Court has given credence to arguments that refer to statutory right violations
having to do with wealth inequities, so long as the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses are violated. 97 Indeed, by focusing on the intersection between
procedural due process and equal protection, the Court has the opportunity to “get[]
at the heart of an urgent, practical problem: indigent people often suffer from both
(1) arbitrary decision-making and inadequate access to courts, as well as, (2) the
unequal outcomes that result.” 98 Sometimes, claims brought under both clauses are
dubbed “equal process” claims. 99 These claims are increasingly featured in court
opinions. 100 Accordingly, scholars believe bringing claims consistent with this
reasoning may yield promising results for plaintiffs’. 101
Although this analysis has yet to be recognized by the Supreme Court as a
way to trigger strict scrutiny, scholars Brandon L. Garrett and Kerry Abrams
theorize that by relying on the intersection of these two rights, “separate concerns
with procedural arbitrariness can heighten the concern about discrimination.” 102 By
combining the issues into a single procedural and substantive claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment, a lawyer can argue that “[g]roups left out of the political
process may face arbitrary treatment, which is of distinct concern and adds weight
to their claims, even if they are not recognized as a suspect class . . . .” 103 This was
essentially the route taken by the Eleventh Circuit in Jones v. Governor of
Florida. 104 There, the court applied heightened scrutiny where felons were

97

98
99

100
101
102
103
104

Reconciling Rational-Basis Review: When Does Rational Basis Bite?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070 (2015), and
Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND.
L.J. 779 (1987).
See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665–67, 674 (1983) (holding that there was a constitutional violation
where unfair process and wealth inequality were at issue); Brandon L. Garrett, Wealth, Equal Protection,
and Due Process, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 402 (2019) (“Yet wealth disparities do still receive careful
equal protection scrutiny, just not based on equal protection alone.”); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal
Protection, HARV. L. REV. 747, 749–50 (2011) [hereinafter Yoshino, New Equal Protection] (“The Court has
long used the Due Process Clauses to further equality concerns, such as those relating to indigent
individuals, national origin minorities, racial minorities, religious minorities, sexual minorities, and
women.” (emphasis added)).
Garrett, supra note 97, at 405.
Id. at 402 (“‘[E]qual process’ claims arise from the line of Supreme Court and lower court cases in which
wealth inequality is a central concern.”). For purposes of this article, I will refer to these types of claims as
equal process claims.
Id. at 402–03.
Id. at 405–06.
Id. at 447.
Id.
950 F.3d 795 (11th Cir. 2020).
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foreclosed from exercising their right to vote if they had outstanding court fees. 105
The court explained:
heightened scrutiny applies in this case because we are faced with a
narrow exception to traditional rational basis review: the creation of
wealth classification that punishes those genuinely unable to pay fees,
fines and restitution more harshly than those able to pay—that is, it
punishes more harshly solely on account of wealth . . . . 106
This argument, therefore, could persuade courts that statutes criminalizing
homelessness should be reviewed under strict scrutiny. 107
The leading case joining the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses to
hold a statute unconstitutional is Bearden v. Georgia. 108 Bearden involved an
indigent individual who was imprisoned as a result of his inability to pay fines and
fees required by his probation. 109 The Supreme Court analyzed the issue by
reviewing Due Process and Equal Protection jurisprudence, concluding that
utilizing principles from both clauses separately was not a novel methodology to
deciding cases. 110 The Court implied that to determine the statute’s
constitutionality, the Court must address both the due process and equal protection
questions presented, in a single analysis: 111
Whether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the
issue cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole
analysis, but rather requires a careful inquiry into such factors as “the
nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is
affected, the rationality of the connection between legislative means
and purpose, and the existence of alternative means for effectuating
the purpose . . . .” 112
Subsequently, the Supreme Court utilized this doctrine to invalidate statutes that
infringed on the plaintiff’s converging equality and due process rights.
Homeless plaintiffs have a good argument that statutes effectively
criminalizing homelessness are unconstitutional using an equal process analysis.
Statutes, such as those targeting “camping” or “panhandling,” classify such
105
106
107

108
109
110
111

112

Id. at 804, 808–09.
Id. at 809.
See Garrett, supra note 97, at 446–47. See generally Fred Lautz, Note, Equal Protection and Revocation of
an Indigent’s Probation for Failure to Meet Monetary Conditions: Bearden v. Georgia, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 121
(reviewing Bearden v. Georgia and its progeny, concluding that the line of cases suggests courts should
apply strict scrutiny to cases where defendants are treated differently in the criminal justice system due to
their wealth).
461 U.S. 660, 660 (1983) (holding the statute was unconstitutional as applied).
Id. at 661.
Id. at 664–67.
Id. at 665–66; see also Garrett, supra, note 97, at 419 (“The Court did not suggest that it was departing
from Rodriguez and applying heightened scrutiny to class-based discrimination. Instead, the result followed
from the combination of class-based harm and unfair and arbitrary procedures. It was an intersectional and
cumulative analysis.”).
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666–67 (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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activities as misdemeanors. 113 Misdemeanor charges result either in minor fines or
in jail time; sometimes both. The main difference between misdemeanors and
felonies is that the former class of crime is minor and as such punishment is
limited—usually by up to 364 days in jail and a certain monetary payment. 114
Because homeless individuals have scarce, if any, access to money, the court may be
influenced to impose jail time for any charge accrued. Alternatively, if the court
imposes a fine, the homeless plaintiff is usually not in a position to pay it. If they
don’t pay it, the individual will be in a position where they could be charged with
another crime, or imprisoned. 115 While challenging a specific statute will require a
more specific analysis showing wealth discrimination against the homeless, this
type of statutory enforcement scheme is clearly identifiable discrimination based on
economic status.
There are alternatives to this type of criminalization. There are innumerable
government-funded and NGO conducted studies showing alternatives to
criminalization are viable and result in decreased numbers of homeless. 116 For
example, in Syracuse, New York, Mayor Stephanie Miner’s rejection of
criminalization policies and her emphasis on a Housing First model resulted in the
city becoming one of the nation’s first to end veteran homelessness. 117 Thus, while
proponents of criminalization statutes purport the statutes to be a remedy for
homelessness, the total deprivation of liberty and the perpetuation of homelessness
that results from the arrest of these individuals cannot be logically shown to further
legislative means and purpose.
B. Intermediate Scrutiny
Intermediate scrutiny is fundamentally a subset of heightened scrutiny. In
other words, arguing for strict and intermediate scrutiny is essentially the same. 118
113

114

115

116
117
118

See SACRAMENTO, CAL., CODE § 12.52.030 (effective Jan. 14, 2021) (prohibiting camping or using “camp
paraphernalia” on any public or private property); MIAMI, FLA., CODE § 37-8 (2020) (prohibiting
panhandling in downtown business district of the city); see also Mark Roseman, Misdemeanors: Trapdoor
Justice for the Poor and Homeless, MEDIUM (Feb. 07, 2019),
https://medium.com/@markeroseman/misdemeanors-trapdoor-justice-for-the-poor-and-homeless7ddf47ba72fc (discussing the criminalization of unavoidable behaviors).
Misdemeanor Sentencing Trends, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 29, 2019) ,
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/misdemeanor-sentencing-trends.aspx (“The most
common misdemeanor-felony penalty threshold is one year.”); Roseman, supra note 113 (citing aggravated
misdemeanors in California with a maximum punishment of up to 364 days in jail and a fine in excess of
$1,000).
See Joseph Shapiro, Jail Time for Unpaid Court Fines and Fees Can Create Cycle of Poverty, NPR (Feb. 9,
2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/02/09/384968360/jail-time-for-unpaid-court-fines-andfees-can-create-cycle-of-poverty; see also Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, the Poor are Paying the Price,
NPR (May 19, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-punish-the-poor
(discussing the poverty cycle of court fees for low-income individuals).
See, e.g., U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, supra note 4, at 36–38 (proposing empirical
solutions as alternatives to criminalization of homelessness in communities).
NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, supra note 48, at 40.
See Pollvogt, supra note 15, at 743 (“Levels of scrutiny . . . come in essentially two varieties: rational basis
review and heightened scrutiny.”).
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A court determines based on these arguments which “heightened” scrutiny to
impose. The traditional equal protection analysis is likely a better-suited argument
for intermediate scrutiny than strict scrutiny due to precedent showing the Court’s
recent apprehension to recognize suspect classes solely under the Equal Protection
clause. 119 Although it is unclear how the Court separates classes deemed quasisuspect or suspect, if a class possesses at least some of the characteristics necessary
to be suspect, “it should qualify at least for protection as a quasi-suspect class.” 120
Homeless people should be deemed a “quasi-suspect” class in accord with
equal protection and statutes discriminating against them should trigger
intermediate scrutiny. It has already been determined that aside from narrow
exceptions, wealth discrimination requires only rational basis review. 121 In San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Court stated that wealth
discrimination alone was not enough to merit strict scrutiny. 122 There, the plaintiffs
challenged Texas’s statutory taxation scheme that enabled children with wealthier
families to pay more taxes to their school and consequently the wealthier district
paid much more in per-pupil expenses. 123 The Court found that strict scrutiny was
unavailable to the plaintiffs because they were unable to show that the statutory
scheme discriminated against a specific class of poor individuals while also
demonstrating an absolute deprivation of education. 124 However, there are
differences in the discriminatory effects of the statute at issue in Rodriguez and
statutes that could be challenged for criminalizing homeless people. Moreover, the
Court acknowledged that the classification issue presented in Rodriguez was “sui
generis,” 125 so the Court would not likely find the same problems in a challenge
brought for homeless plaintiffs. Accordingly, no court has yet determined if the
homeless are a suspect or quasi-suspect class. 126 Although, improbable, arguing for
heightened scrutiny under the traditional Equal Protection Clause analysis may yet
avail.

119

120
121
122
123
124
125
126

See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445–46 (1985) (holding mentally retarded
people are not a suspect class); Yoshino, New Equal Protection, supra note 84, at 748 (“Over the past
decades, the Court has systematically denied constitutional protection to new groups, curtailed it for
already covered groups, and limited Congress’s capacity to protect groups through civil rights legislation.”
(footnotes omitted)).
Moran, supra note 63, at 918–19.
See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (“[T]his Court has held repeatedly that poverty, standing
alone, is not a suspect classification.” (citing James v. Valterra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971))).
411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973).
Id. at 4–16.
Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 18.
See, e.g., Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442, 1449 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (“[Plaintiffs acknowledge]
that there is no precedent recognizing the homeless as a suspect class . . . .”). However, some courts have
acknowledged that the homeless may be a suspect class. See Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1578
(S.D. Fla. 1992) (“This court is not entirely convinced that homelessness as a class has none of these
‘traditional indicia of suspectness.’ It can be argued that the homeless are saddled with such disabilities, or
have been subjected to a history of unequal treatment or are so politically powerless that extraordinary
protection of the homeless as a class is warranted.”).
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To argue for intermediate scrutiny, it is necessary to show that a certain
class is “quasi-suspect.” Courts recognize a class as suspect if the group has the
“indicia of suspectness.” 127 This indicia presents in a set of factors, including that
the group: (1) is a discrete and insular minority, (2) is politically powerless, (3) has
historically been discriminated against, (4) has a trait unrelated to the group’s
capacity to contribute to society, and (5) has an immutable trait. 128 A court
determines whether the class is suspect based on how many of these factors are
met. 129 The “qualification for quasi-suspectness turns on whether a class shares at
least some . . . indicia of suspectness.” 130 It may also be important to the court that
the class in question overlaps with other recognized suspect classes. 131
The “discrete and insular minority” has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court in two ways: broadly and narrowly. 132 The homeless, as a class, fit both
definitions. The broad definition, promulgated in Carolene Products, describes a
discrete and insular minority as ‘“any socially isolated minority group,’ or any group
that is ‘not embraced within the bond of community kinship, but . . . held at arm’s
length by the group or groups that possess dominant political and economic
power.’” 133 The narrow, linguistic definition requires that the class is literally
isolated from the mainstream. The homeless are both self-isolated and isolated by
the general public. 134 Localities and state governments commonly adopt
enforcement tactics and legislation that criminalize homeless individuals, thereby
accommodating community members who complain about the homeless individual’s
presence. 135 Moreover, governments may build shelters in an attempt to “sweep
homeless people from public view.” 136 As a result of these tactics, homeless people
effectively go into hiding “by living in more dispersed groups or even alone.” 137 If a
class is shown to be a discrete and insular minority, the Court has acknowledged
that it is required to engage in a more searching inquiry to ensure its equality is

127
128

129
130
131
132
133

134

135
136
137

Moran, supra note 63, at 916.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442–47 (1985); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 686–87 (1973).
Pollvogt, supra note 15, at 742.
Moran, supra note 63, at 916 (emphasis added).
Id. at 920 (discussing additional, non-determinative factor of overlap).
Jennifer E. Watson, Note, When No Place is Home: Why the Homeless Deserve Suspect Classification, 88
IOWA L. REV. 501, 516–18 (2003).
Id. at 516–17 (alternations in original) (quoting Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products
Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1105 n.72 (1982)).
SCHNABLY, supra note 19, at 556–60 (explaining how local governments have engaged in a strategy to make
the homeless “invisible,” and how the homeless have accommodated that strategy by employing the same to
avoid harassment).
See supra Part I.C. (explaining criminalization motives and methods for locales and governments).
SCHNABLY, supra note 19, at 559.
Id. at 560.
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upheld. 138 This factor is arguably the most persuasive and important to the
courts. 139
The unhoused population are also a politically powerless group. They
struggle to exercise the right to vote due to residency and domicile requirements,
and identification requirements, among others. 140 As the Supreme Court explained,
“the political franchise of voting is . . . regarded as a fundamental political right,
because [it is] preservative of all rights.” 141 As such, without a residence, the
unhoused population inevitably do not meet residency requirements and cannot
influence the political process. 142 There has been some organization around
homeless rights in recent years, but it is important to note that “much of the
political organizing . . . has relied heavily on appeals to the charity of the betteroff.” 143 Making headway in politics is no easy task and requires powerful allies and
advocates. These allies are hard to find absent personal assets or clout—of which
the homeless have neither.
Beginning in the fourteenth century and continuing today, the homeless have
been subject to discrimination. 144 In the 1600’s, the homeless, otherwise known as
“vagrants,” and later “tramps,” were social outcasts, considered no better than
criminals. 145 Indeed, “[t]he homeless have overwhelmingly been ‘subjected to a
history of purposeful and unequal treatment.’” 146 This discriminatory treatment and
terminology used to describe the homeless has continued today. Current
criminalization statutory schemes reveal legislatures’ disdain for the homeless, and
the lack of community reprimand for such legislation reveals implicit agreement—
at the very least—by the general public. 147 Beyond legislation, many homeless
individuals report they have suffered discrimination by private businesses and law

138
139
140

141

142

143
144
145

146
147

United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4; see Watson, supra note 132, at 516.
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1012 (1978) (arguing that discreteness and
insularity should be the central criteria of suspectness and quasi-suspectness).
Watson, supra note 132, at 522; see Kriston Capps, Voting While Homeless, BLOOMBERG: CITYLAB (Nov. 8,
2016, 4:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-08/the-struggle-to-vote-while-homeless.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); see also Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 667 (1966) (holding poll tax violates Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S 533, 562 (1964) (holding states must create legislative districts with substantially equal
number of voters to comply with Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
Watson, supra note 132, at 522. But see SCHNABLY, supra note 19, at 569 (“[H]omeless people have formed
unions . . . [t]hey have marched to city halls, invaded city council meetings, occupied local housing offices,
and initiated drives to register to vote, all in an effort to give themselves their own voice in politics.”).
SCHNABLY, supra note 19, at 570.
Watson, supra note 132, at 523.
KENNETH L. KUSMER, DOWN AND OUT, ON THE ROAD: THE HOMELESS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 13, 29 (2001) (“As
early as 1640 ‘vagrant persons’ were listed among the social outcasts that peace officers in Boston were
charged with apprehending.”).
Watson, supra note 132, at 523 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
See supra Part I.C.
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enforcement. 148 Poor public perception and discrimination is reflected ubiquitously
in both historic and present treatment of the homeless in the United States.
The fact of an individual’s homelessness does not bear on his ability to
contribute to society. A characteristic that "bears no relation to [the] ability to
perform or contribute to society” serves as a suspect basis to classify a group. 149 The
homeless have no outstanding character traits, disabilities, or criminal proclivities
deterring their ability to contribute to society. 150 Instead, they are a group suffering
due to the shortfalls in America’s system of government, that leaves its most
impoverished without stable housing. 151 “A peaceful beggar poses no threat to
society.” 152 Homelessness, therefore, is not a classification that relates in any way to
an individual’s ability to contribute to society and, if used as a statutory
classification, would “have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class . . . to
inferior legal status.” 153
The final factor, immutability, is defined by courts more broadly than the text
suggests. 154 Immutability is sometimes defined as a “non-volitional
characteristic.” 155 Logic, precedent, and case studies contend that homelessness is
necessarily involuntary. 156 However, even if the Court determines homelessness
148

149
150
151

152
153
154

155
156

Scott Keyes, Virtually All Homeless People Experience Discrimination, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 21, 2014, 5:16
PM), https://archive.thinkprogress.org/virtually-all-homeless-people-experience-discrimination126b5eb4d610/ (“More than 70 percent reported they had experienced discrimination from private
businesses. Two in three said they’d been unfairly targeted by law enforcement. . . .”).
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
See generally Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1582–83 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (discussing how the homeless
are no more criminal, or disabled than any other portion of society, aside from their poverty).
See supra Part II.A (discussing the causes of homelessness, namely that the government cut federal funding
over the last twenty years instead of supplementing it, or adjusting it for inflation); see also U.S.
INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, supra note 4, at 6 (“The current economic recession and
foreclosure crisis exacerbate the problem of homelessness, threatening to push these numbers even higher,
as they have resulted in federal, state, and local budgetary limitations that undercut the ability of
communities to provide adequate housing and services needed to prevent and end homelessness.”).
Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1583.
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686–87.
See Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 96, at 2085 (citing Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir.
1989) (en banc) (Norris, J., concurring) (“It is clear that by ‘immutability’ the Court has never meant strict
immutability in the sense that members of the class must be physically unable to change or mask the trait
defining their class. People can have operations to change their sex. Aliens can ordinarily become
naturalized citizens. The status of illegitimate children can be changed. People can frequently hide their
national origin by changing their customs, their names, or their associations. Lighter skinned blacks can
sometimes ‘pass’ for white, as can Latinos for Anglos, and some people can even change their racial
appearance with pigment injections. At a minimum, then, the Supreme Court is willing to treat a trait as
effectively immutable if changing it would involve great difficulty, such as requiring a major physical
change or a traumatic change of identity.”).
Watson, supra note 132, at 527.
See Jessica Lipscomb, Advocate’s Videos Tell the Story of Miami Beach’s Homeless, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Nov.
17, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/advocates-videos-tell-the-story-of-miami-beachshomeless-8928779 (“Through the process of filming her videos, Navarette found only one person who said he
was cool with being homeless. Everyone else unequivocally agreed they’d rather be in a shelter, hotel, or
apartment.”). See generally NAT’L L. CTR ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, supra note 48 (discussing the many
reasons causing individuals and families to be homeless–all involuntary). For an analysis showing why the
court should hold homelessness is an immutable characteristic, see Watson, supra note 132, at 526–33.
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does not fit the Court’s definition, immutability is considered neither a necessary
nor sufficient factor to show a class should receive heightened scrutiny. 157
The overwhelming analysis showing homelessness meets most factors for
suspectness should be persuasive to the judiciary that the homeless are at least a
quasi-suspect class. Notably, huge disparities in racial minorities represented in the
homeless population as compared to the general population may lend more support
to the argument that the class should be afforded more protection by the Court. 158
These disparities, in conjunction with the extra weight accorded those classes
deemed “discrete and insular,” is more evidence that the homeless should receive
heightened scrutiny.
C. Rational Basis “with a Bite” Scrutiny
Rational basis “with a bite” review has never been explicitly mentioned by
the United States Supreme Court. 159 However, considering the extremely
deferential nature of rational basis review, when the Court has invalidated statutes
under this standard, it “appears to be employing a higher standard.” 160 Scholars
dubbed this standard “rational basis with a bite.” 161
There are two predominant interpretations of how and when rational basis
“bites.” The first employs the same traditional equal protection analysis used to
determine if a class is suspect or quasi-suspect. 162 It arguably utilizes more factors
than the traditional analysis, including and especially: animus. 163 The second
interpretation focuses solely on that factor. 164 Under this interpretation, the
plaintiff’s burden is only to show the presence of actual animus for the court to
strike down the law. 165 The first interpretation relies on the same analysis done in
the preceding section, and for that reason, this section will focus on the second
interpretation. 166
For legislation to be struck down in accord with a biting rational basis
review, a lawyer will have to show that the legislation was promulgated with a
157

158
159

160
161
162
163
164
165

166

See Moran, supra note 63, at 918 (“Immutability . . . cannot serve as a touchstone of suspectness, even
though it is not entirely irrelevant.”); Pollvogt, supra note 15, at 742 (explaining that of the numerous
factors used to determine the suspectness of a class, only some portion of them must be shown for the court
to grant suspect or quasi-suspect status).
See supra Part I.A.
Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 96, at 2072–73; see also Kenji Yoshino, Why the Court Can Strike Down
Marriage Restrictions Under Rational-Basis Review, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331, 333 (2013)
[hereinafter Yoshino, Rational-Basis Review] (“Ordinary rational-basis review, then, operates as a free pass
for legislation.”).
Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 96, at 2071–72.
Id.
Id. at 2072.
Yoshino, Rational-Basis Review, supra note 159, at 335.
See id.
See id. (explaining that precedent and logic belie the argument that the plaintiff must rebut any and all
other reasons for legislation to the exclusion of the sole desire to harm a group).
See supra Part II.B.
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“bare . . . desire to harm” a specific group. 167 In the seminal case, Moreno, the Court
reviewed the legislative history and found that the statute at issue passed in order
to “prevent so-called ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communes’ from participating in the”
government program. 168 The Court explained that such a bare desire to harm a
politically unpopular group could not constitute a legitimate governmental
interest. 169 If the Court would have upheld such a provision on those grounds, it
would essentially discredit the constitutional right to equality. 170 Subsequently,
when the Court has detected animus it has imposed a rational basis with a bite
standard of review. 171
The Court has detected animus through either direct evidence or inferential
evidence based on the structure of the law. 172 Direct evidence is often found through
the legislative history of a piece of legislation, such as in Moreno. 173 Alternatively,
the Court has examined the purported reasons for legislation, and if it ultimately
finds them incredible, it has inferred animus. 174 This is the method the Court
utilized in Romer, where it explained: “the breadth of the legislation,” was so far
removed from the justifications for the legislation at issue that they were impossible
to credit. 175 Thus, in order to receive heightened scrutiny by way of rational basis
with a bite review, a lawyer would need to show the legislature had animus for the
homeless.
CONCLUSION
There are numerous ways to attain heightened scrutiny for America’s
homeless under the Fourteenth Amendment. This group exists as a symptom of
disparities present in the system of government that does not provide aid to its most
needy and impoverished. Legislatures have an obligation to remedy the struggles
and vulnerabilities unique to the homeless population. Unfortunately, legislatures
have for too long relied on the crutch of criminalization. If the judiciary imposes
heightened scrutiny on statutes discriminating against the homeless, legislatures
will be forced to focus on more productive measures to fix the problem. By utilizing
any of the advocacy routes enumerated to attain heightened scrutiny, lawyers
representing homeless plaintiffs have a strong chance of persuading the judiciary.
Employing these arguments may result in a more equitable American society and
jurisprudence.
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

174
175

U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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